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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to compare the efficiency of the Spanish public and 
publicly-subsidised private high schools using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) fed 
by the results provided by a hierarchical linear model (HLM) applied to PISA-2006 
(Programme for International Students Assessment) microdata. This study places 
special emphasis on the estimation of the determinants of school outcomes, the 
educational production function being estimated through an HLM that takes into 
account the nested nature of PISA data. Inefficiencies are then measured through the 
DEA and decomposed into managerial (related to individual performance) and 
programme (related to structural differences between management models), following 
Silva Portela and Thanassoulis (2001) approach. Once differences in pupils’ 
background and individual management inefficiencies have been eliminated, results 
reveal that Spanish public high schools are more efficient than publicly-subsidised 
private ones. 
 3
1. Introduction 
 
One of the main traits defining the compulsory Spanish educational system is its mixed 
or dual character i.e. a majority public network and a substantial private sector. Within 
the latter, an important position is occupied by publicly-subsidised private schools 
(PSPS hereafter). These schools, which serve 26% of secondary school enrolment, are 
owned and run privately but financed by local education authorities and the central 
government through a system of agreements regulated by the 1985 Right to Education 
Act (LODE, in its Spanish initials)1. The Spanish policy of financing some private 
schools is aimed at allowing parents to freely choose between different schools and, 
indirectly, at stimulating competition between schools to attract and retain students, 
which should bring with improved school efficiency. 
 
The Spanish Publicly-Subsidised Private Schools System is based on an administrative 
model which establishes the reciprocal rights and obligations of the owner of the private 
centre and the Education Authority with regard to the economic system, duration, 
extension and termination of the agreement and other conditions for the provision of 
education2.  
 
Formally, the Spanish system PSPS may be seen as a singular mechanism of public 
intervention in the educational sector. The PSPS system combines public funding and 
private management of schools. These peculiar characteristics of PSPS make very 
attractive to explore the relative efficiency of this type of schools in relation to public 
schools (hereafter PS). The scarcity of research in Spain on the impact of these two 
alternative systems of free education provision (public and publicly-subsidised) on 
student performance justifies political interest of this analysis. Is the private 
                                                          
1 The student distribution among different types of schools in Spain is the following: 67% in public 
schools, 7% private-independent schools and 26% publicly-subsidised private schools. 
2 The obligations of schools include the following: providing free teaching at the educational level agreed, 
requesting authorisation for the charging of any fees for complementary activities, maintaining a specific 
pupil/teacher ratio and applying the same admission criteria as public schools. In turn, the Administration 
undertakes to finance the activity of the school through a system of economic modules per educational 
establishment, as established in the General State Budget.  
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management model of Spanish PSPS more efficient than the public management model 
of Spanish PS? This is the ultimate question we intend to answer in the context of the 
data provided by the third wave of the Programme for International Student Assessment 
(PISA-2006) carried out by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD).  
 
At a first glance, average results on PISA-2006 outcomes could lead us to consider 
PSPS more efficient than PS, since crude results are higher in the former ones. 
Certainly, the average score on science competencies for PSPS reaches 502.86, whereas 
for PS is 475.08 (the average score for the whole population being 488.40) and the 
ANOVA test (5.89) points out significant statistical differences between these two 
results. Paying attention to output variables would only be fair if the resources of 
schools were identical (Kirjavainen and Loikkanen, 1998). However, in actual fact PS 
and PSPS differ as much in terms of inputs they employ as in their outputs. Main 
differences are concentrated in pupil characteristics (socio-economic status, parents’ 
education level and job, immigration status) as can be seen in Table A1 in the 
Appendix. Since several studies prove that these characteristics also affect the results 
obtained by students (Sirin, 2005), the challenge is to evaluate the performance of 
schools in a multi-dimensional setting.  
 
In order to assess the impact of ownership on school efficiency, we apply a non-
parametric frontier analysis to the sample of Spanish PSPS and PS participating in 
PISA-2006. The theoretical framework for this work is provided by research involved in 
assessing the net differential quality of public and private schools. The seminal work by 
Coleman, Hoffer and Kilgore (1982) is commonly considered as the origin of this 
literature. Empirical methodologies used in this paper are multilevel analysis and data 
envelopment analysis (hereafter DEA). As far as we know, both methodologies have 
not been jointly employed in any paper about the assessment of school efficiency. 
 
Two aspects distinguish this work from previous ones. First of all, a special attention is 
paid to the empirical estimation of the underlying educational technology in the PISA-
2006 data. Hierarchical structure of this dataset involves that estimations must be 
carried out by means of a multilevel analysis. Conclusions reached from these 
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regressions allow us to select the variables for the subsequent DEA efficiency analysis 
in a robust empirical way. Secondly, our study decomposes the overall inefficiencies of 
each school into managerial (due to its individual performance) and programme (due to 
structural differences between public and private management models) components. In 
order to undertake this decomposition, we apply the approach of Silva Portela and 
Thanassoulis (2001) which is based on Charnes et al. (1981). 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we review the literature 
devoted to study the relationship between school efficiency and public or private 
ownership. The estimation of the determinants of educational outcomes in PISA-2006 is 
carried out in Section 3. The empirical assessment of the efficiency of Spanish PS and 
PSPS is presented in Section 4. The final Section closes the paper with a summary of 
the main conclusions. 
 
2. The efficiency of public and private schools: Previous studies 
 
There is a fairly widely-held belief in certain academic and social circles that private 
schools are more efficient than public ones, assessment based upon the economic 
reasoning which links efficiency to free market competition.  
 
For advocates of private schools, the competition which these schools are subjected to 
(both within their own system and with public schools), due to their need to attract 
pupils, forces them to be very receptive to their customers’ demands, and stimulates 
both efficient use of resources and an improvement in the quality of the education 
provided (Chubb and Moe, 1990, Friedman and Friedman, 1981). It has been stated that 
the strong dependence upon satisfying the desires and expectations of users for their 
survival and economic success forces private schools to act efficiently and effectively: 
efficiently as, otherwise, what they provide will be at a disadvantage to the offering of 
their competitors; and effectively, since if they do not satisfy their customers’ demands, 
pupils may leave and go elsewhere, where they are better served (Alchian, 1950). 
Definitively, the threat of extinction which private schools face, if badly managed, leads 
invisibly to these schools acting in the best way possible. 
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In contrast, public schools are seen as monopolies at a local level, with a captive 
audience guaranteed by the criterion of assigning school places on the basis of 
residential area (Peterson, 1990; Levin, 1976; Pincus, 1974; O’Donogue, 1971). The 
opportunity for public school pupils to go elsewhere is therefore very limited for this 
reason, implying the tieboutian mechanisms of voting with your feet (see Tiebout, 1956) 
which, apart from being very costly in economic terms, is very much influenced by 
circumstances other than strictly educational ones. Furthermore, the alternative of 
changing over to a private school is also strongly conditioned by the price differential 
between the public and private supply, so that, as Chubb and Moe (1990) point out, this 
option will only be taken in cases where the value of private schools, as perceived by 
families, is much higher than that of public schools. Nor must we forget that this 
possibility is, of course, limited to a minority of the population: those with greater 
economic resources. All these considerations lead some authors to consider that, in 
contrast to the private school setting, achieving efficiency and responding to consumer 
demands plays a very secondary role in public schools.  
 
However, a more detailed analysis of schools’ day-to-day functioning calls the above 
reasoning into question. This is due to the fact that the ability of users in the education 
sector to exercise an informed choice – a key element for guaranteeing the potential 
benefits from competition– is very limited, given the ambiguous nature of the concept 
of school quality. 
 
In actual fact, after almost forty years of research on the subject, the knowledge of 
aspects which contribute to defining what is a ‘good school’ is still very sketchy (see 
Hanushek, 2003, 1997 and 1986). Schools are to a large extent still black boxes for the 
academics who research them; and even more so, therefore, for their users. This is due 
to the peculiarities of the education system’s production process which make it difficult 
to clarify the responsibilities which may be attributable to schools, and the definition of 
a representative concept of school quality (see Mancebón and Bandrés, 1999). In a 
context of this nature, the best way to assess how well each school functions is the 
direct contact with it. However, “trying out the product” in the educational sphere 
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involves major personal costs, given the problems of adaptation which changing schools 
usually involves. This is what Glennerster (1991) terms the sunk costs associated with 
the choice of a school.  
 
The immediate consequence of this situation may be that individuals who must choose 
between different schooling alternatives do so on the basis of highly visible variables 
such as: the religious leanings of the school; its facilities; extra-curricular activities; the 
type of pupils attending; proximity to the home, etc.; factors all of which are of a non-
academic nature, and whose relationship with the quality of the actual education is not 
clearly established. On occasions, families may have information on schools’ average 
academic results although, as Echols and Willms (1995) underline, these do not indicate 
much as regards quality if they are not accompanied by information on the academic 
and/or socio-economic background of the pupils. Lee, Croninger and Smith (1996) 
mention the need to make education decisions on the basis of virtually anecdotal or very 
superficial data on school quality, given that any other more thorough assessment would 
mean taking on board high information-related costs.  
 
These limitations to access information on schools question very seriously any effect of 
competition over quality between different schools, whether these are public or private, 
since this is not an observable measurement for users. The theoretical argument of those 
who defend private education, as discussed above, is therefore questionable.  
 
Additionally, empirical research devoted to clarify the relationship between efficiency 
of schools and public or private ownership is not conclusive. The origins of this 
literature are in Coleman, Hoffer and Kilgore (1982) who, using cross-section 
achievement equations, concluded that private schools were more effective than public 
schools at educating students, even after controlling for differences in the personal and 
socio-economic background of students. Since then, a number of studies have attempted 
to contrast this result in a wide range of educational contexts, through the use of 
parametric and non-parametric techniques. The conclusions reached in this literature are 
mixed: while a number of studies tend to confirm the results obtained by Coleman et al. 
(1982) (Opdenakker and Van Damme, 2006; Bettinger, 2005; Mizzala et al., 2002; Bedi 
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and Garg, 2000; Stevans and Sessions, 2000; Neal, 1997; Jiménez et al., 1991; Chubb 
and Moe, 1990 and Hanushek, 1986), in others the superiority of private schools is 
cancelled out when a wide range of controls are included in the analysis (Perelman and 
Santin, 2008; Mancebón and Muñiz, 2008; Calero and Escardíbul, 2007; Abburrà, 2005; 
Fertig, 2003; Kirjavainen and Loikkanen, 1998, Goldhaber, 1996, and Sander, 1996) or 
this is reduced to specific measurements of the output analysed (Greene and Kang, 
2004), or to specific groups of students defined by race, ethnic group, or academic or 
socio-economic profile (Figlio and Stone, 1997). In some cases, a different effect for 
independent private schools and for PSPS (see Dronkers and Robert, 2008; Corten and 
Dronkers, 2006). 
 
Against this background, our work may be seen as a new contribution to this puzzling 
debate about the efficiency of public versus private schools.  
 
3. Estimation of the determinants of academic achievement in PISA-2006 
 
This Section represents a first and necessary step for selecting correctly the input 
variables needed for feeding the DEA analysis which is carried out in the next Section. 
Subsection 3.1 presents the literature review of the determinants of academic 
achievement. An econometric model is designed from the previous review, the results 
being presented in Subsection 3.3. Previously, Subsection 3.2 describes the data and 
methodology used in the analysis. 
 
3.1. Determinants of educational outcomes. Literature review 
 
Our approach to the determinants of educational outcomes will be structured by means 
of a distinction between two levels, the first one corresponding to student variables and 
the second one to school variables. In the student level, we will differentiate between 
three areas: first, personal variables; second, variables related to the family socio-
cultural and economic characteristics; and, third, variables related to the household 
resources and the use of these resources. In the school level, four different areas will be 
established: first, general variables describing the school; second, variables describing 
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the students of the school (and, hence, the peer-effects generated by the interaction 
between students); third, variables related to the human and physical resources used by 
the schools and, finally, a fourth group of variables describing some educational 
processes undertaken by the school. Following this structure, in this Subsection we 
review how these variables affect the educational output, taking into account recent 
theoretical developments and the empirical evidence available in literature. 
 
In the student level, gender stands among the most important personal variables. Girls’ 
school performance is usually better than boys’; however, in the case of maths and 
science competencies the results are the opposite. In the three competencies measured in 
the PISA evaluation, for example, girls do better than boys only in reading, lagging 
behind in maths and science. (see OECD, 2006). 
 
Still in the student level, a great amount of empirical evidence has been provided for the 
household socio-cultural and socio-economic characteristics as determinants of 
educational outcomes. The immigration status of the family has received a special 
attention in recent years. Empirical evidence points out that students born abroad tend to 
underperform (even after controlling for other significant variables), while there are no 
significant differences between students born in the country with foreign parents and 
national students (see Calero and Escardíbul, 2007, Chiswick and Debburman, 2004, 
Kao and Tienda, 1995 and Rong and Grant, 1992). Schnepf (2008), using TIMSS, 
PIRLS and PISA data for a set of eight OECD countries, shows that in general there is 
great heterogeneity inside the group of immigrant students, the dispersion of their 
educational results being higher than for national students. Other socio-cultural and 
socio-economic characteristics, such as parental educational level and socio-
professional category, have also received much attention. Some of the most relevant 
studies exploring these effects are Dronkers (2008), Marks (2005), Gamoran (2001) and 
Rumberger and Larson (1998). 
 
The last set of variables in the student level is related to the household resources and 
how the student uses them (see Calero and Escardíbul, 2007; Kang, 2007 and 
Woessman, 2003). Research undertaken with PISA data has stressed the incidence of 
the availability of books and the use of computers with educational objectives in the 
household on the student outcome. Specifically, the availability of books in the 
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household is a very strong determinant of student performance, since it absorbs the 
effect of the family cultural capital transmitted to the student. 
 
In the school level, the general characteristics of the schools are the first area of 
determinants we would like to address. In this area, one of the most relevant aspects 
from both a theoretical and empirical point of view is the public or private ownership. 
Evidence on this area is far from being conclusive, as it has been exposed in Section 2. 
 
Several variables describing the characteristics of students of the school -or the 
classroom- are included in the second area of school level determinants. These 
characteristics impinge, through the peer-effects, on the student’s performance. Authors 
such as Farley (2006), Willms (2006) and Coleman et al. (1966) have analyzed the 
socio-cultural and socio-economic profiles of peers incidence on students performance. 
This kind of approach has also been used to analyze peer-effects generated by 
immigrant students. Calero and Escardíbul (2007) showed, for example, how a high 
concentration of immigrant students is associated with negative effects on the student’s 
performance. However, smaller concentrations of immigrant students do not generate 
any significant effect. 
 
Another area of determinants in the school level is related to the physical and human 
resources available by the school. The detailed review offered by Hanushek (2003) 
makes clear that results in this area are far from being conclusive. In OECD (2007), 
where PISA data are used, most of the variables related to the availability and use of 
resources by the school are not statistically significant. Mancebón and Muñiz (2003), 
after reviewing 42 studies published between 1980 and 2002, suggest that a plausible 
explanation to the lack of significance of school resources when explaining student’s 
performance lies on the fact that most of the reviewed studies are applied to developed 
countries, with relatively high (and similar) levels of school resources  
 
The educational processes undertaken by schools are included in the fourth and last area 
of determinants in the school level. As an example of these processes we will solely 
refer to grouping of students by ability level. Hanushek et al. (2003) and Kang (2007) 
describe how the negative effect of the interaction with low ability students is higher for 
this same group of low ability students. Thus, processes of student grouping by ability 
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level lead to negative effects on low performance students. We could then expect that 
the positive effect of grouping on high performance students to be cancelled by the 
negative effect on low performance students, situation which accounts for Gamoran 
(2004) results, who finds that these practices seldom have the expected positive results. 
 
3.2. Data and methodology 
 
This study uses PISA-2006 microdata for Spain. Since 2000, the PISA programme 
examines every three years the academic achievement of 15 year old students from 
different countries3 in three competencies (reading, mathematics and science). PISA 
focused, in year 2006, on the science competence. PISA results are synthesized using a 
scale with an average score of 500 and a standard deviation of 100, for each of the three 
competencies. This scale is divided into six levels of proficiency, level 1 corresponding 
to low-scorers and level 6 to those students who show high-level thinking and reasoning 
skills. 
 
PISA designs its sample using a two-stage method. In the first stage, a sample of 
schools is randomly selected from the whole list of centres which provide schooling for 
15 year old students. In the second stage, a random sample of 35 students is chosen 
within each of the schools selected in the first stage. The probability of a school of 
being selected in PISA is proportional to its size. As a consequence, larger centres have 
a higher probability of being chosen; nevertheless, students in larger schools have 
smaller probabilities of being selected in comparison with students enrolled in smaller 
schools which have been chosen in the PISA sample. Therefore, the probability for a 
school of being chosen is equal to the result of multiplying the size of the centre ( iN ) by 
the number of schools selected for the sample ( cn ), divided by the total number of 15 
year old students (N).  
 
N
nNp cii
.
_1             (1) 
 
                                                          
3 28 OECD and 4 non-OECD countries took part in PISA-2000. 14 non-OECD members joined the 
programme in 2002. 41 countries participated in PISA-2003. 57 countries (30 OECD; 27 non-OECD) 
took part in 2006. 
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Table 1. Total population and sample size for Spain. 
15 year old population 439.415 
Number of students in PISA-2006 19.604 
Weighted number of students in PISA-2006 381.686 
Number of schools in PISA-2006 682 
 
Source: Own elaboration from PISA 2006 
 
The empirical analysis of the determinants of science competencies in PISA-2006 
which will be used as the main reference for the selection of variables of the DEA study 
is based on a multilevel model, due to the hierarchical structure of the PISA-2006 
dataset4. The principle of independence of variables among the students of each centre 
does not hold, as a consequence of the aforementioned two-stage sampling method 
used. Students enrolled in the same school usually share socio-economic circumstances 
which make the average correlation among the variables of the students within the 
centre to be higher than that found between students of different schools (Hox, 1995)5. 
 
Multilevel models take into account the nested structure of students in schools. 
Hierarchical linear models (HLM, hereafter) calculate a separate regression for each of 
the centres included in the sample (OECD, 2005a). Somers et al. (2004) or Willms 
(2006) are examples of the application of this methodology in the educational field.  
 
In this paper data is structured into two levels: students (level 1) and centres (level 2). 
Multilevel regressions enable to analyze simultaneously the effects of variables of 
different levels and to study the influence of these variables on the inequality within and 
between centres. In other words, HLM enable to identify the proportion of the total 
variance in scholastic achievement which can be attributed to the characteristics of 
schools and students.  
 
0 1
1
n
ij j j kij ij
k
Y X  

    2~ (0, )ij N   (2) 
                                                          
4 Bryk and Raudenbusch (1988) provide a good explanation about the convenience of applying multilevel 
models for analyzing the effects of schools on educational outcomes. 
5 The intra-class correlation in the scientific competencies for the sample used in this paper from a null 
model is 0.15. The intra-class correlation is the proportion of the total variance explained by the 
differences between schools. If the intra-class correlation was equal to zero, it would not be necessary to 
use a multilevel model (as the whole variance would be explained by the differences in the characteristics 
within schools).  
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0 00 01 0
1
j lj jZ       0 0~ (0, )j N   (3) 
1 10 1j j     1 1~ (0, )j N   (4) 
00 10 01 1 0ij kij lj j kij j ijY X Z X            (5) 
 
ijY  is the expected result in science of student “i” enrolled in school “j”. kijX  is a vector 
of “k” independent variables of the individual level and jZ  is a vector of “l” variables 
of the school level. Equation 5 is obtained by substituting equations 3 and 4 (level 2) for 
the   in equation 2 (level 1). It is possible to distinguish in equation 5 a set of fixed 
effects 00 10 01( )kij ljX Z     from a set of random effects 1 0( )j kij j ijX    . 
 
The dependent variable is the score in science for students enrolled in PS and PSPS6. 
This score is calculated using plausible values (PV hereafter) for each student and a 
replication method which enables to obtain efficient estimations (OECD, 2005b). PV 
are random values calculated from the distribution of the results. In PISA, students only 
answer to part of the items which constitute each test. PISA estimates the score of each 
student for all the items using the distribution of probabilities of the different plausible 
values that the student could have for the items. This procedure makes it possible to 
work with more than one estimation of the students results of the students. 
 
3.3. Results 
 
Table 2 presents the results corresponding to the multilevel regression: the first column 
lists the independent variables7 introduced in the model, grouped into three blocks, 
depending on their belonging to the individual, family or school spheres. These 
variables have been included based on the theoretical approaches and empirical 
evidence explained in Subsection 3.1. The second column presents the effects of those 
variables on PISA scores, following the same structure presented in Subsection 3.1 (two 
levels, divided into different areas). The main results are put forward in the following 
lines. On the other hand, Table 3 provides information about the proportion of the 
variance explained, for each level, by the variables included in the complete model, in 
                                                          
6 Our sample includes 18.283 students from 643 schools. 61.8% of the students in the sample are enrolled 
in PS (61.4% of the total schools) and 39.2% in PSPS. Students enrolled in non-subsidised private 
schools are not considered in our analysis. 
7 Further information about the independent variables is provided in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
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comparison to the null model. Nearly 85% of the variance in scores can be attributed to 
differences of the characteristics in students within schools. 
 
 
Table 2. Estimation of fixed effects with robust standard errors in the hierarchical 
lineal model. 
 
Area Variable Coefficient
 INTERCEPT 352.4a
  (6.4)
Individual  
 AGE 8.9a
  (2.7)
 WOMEN -17.8a
  (-10.1)
 REPMORE (student enrolled in 1st or 2nd year of compulsory secondary education).  -110.7a
 ) (-27.6)
 REPONE (student enrolled in 3rd year of compulsory secondary education). -65.8a
 Ref: Student enrolled in 4th year of compulsory secondary education (-29.7)
Household 1. Socioeconomic and cultural characteristics
 SECGEN (born in Spain; immigrant parents) 8.2
  (0.7)
 FIRST3 (born in a foreign country; in Spain for 3 years or less) -38.0a
  (-3.4)
 FIRST4 (born in a foreign country; in Spain for 4 or more years) -20.7b
 Ref: Born in Spain; Spanish parents (-2.2)
 LANG2 (national student that speaks a non-national language at home) -6.0
  (-0.5)
 LANG3 (foreign student that speaks a national language at home) 7.7
  (0.9)
 LANG4 (foreign student that speaks a non-national language at home) 2.7
 Ref: National student that speaks a national language at home (0.2)
 ACTIVE (both parents are economically active) 13.1a
  (5.8)
 NQWHITEC (white collar, low skilled father) -7.2b
  (-2.5)
 QBLUEC (blue collar, high skilled father) -5.4b
  (-2.0)
 NQBLUEC (blue collar, low skilled father) -8.5a
 Ref: White collar, high skilled father (-3.0)
 MOTSCHY(years of schooling of the mother) 0.8a
  (2.9)
 FATSCHY (years of schooling of the father) 0.4
  (1.2)
Household 2. Educational resources and their use
 NCOMPUT (no computer at home) -7.1
  (-1.4)
 SPUSECOM (sporadic use of computers) -6.3b
  (-2.5)
 NUSECOM (never uses a computer) 1.9
 Ref: Frequent use of computers (-2.0)
 SPOWRITE (sporadic use of word processors) 
 
7.7a
 (3.2)
 NEVWRITE (never uses word processors) -16.0a
 Ref: Frequent use of word processors (-4.6)
 25BOOKS (0 to 25 books at home) -42.2a
  (-13.2)
 100BOOKS (26 to 100 books at home) -21.0a
  (-7.9)
 200BOOKS (101 to 200 books at home) -9.1a
 Ref: More than 200 books at home (-3.2)
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Table 2. Estimation of fixed effects with robust standard errors in the hierarchical 
lineal model (cont). 
 
Area Variable Coefficient
School 1. School characteristics 
 PRIVPUBF (publicly subsidised private school) -15.2c
  (-1.7)
 SCHSIZ (school size) -0.0
  (-0.1)
 CITYSIZ2 (school in a city with a population of 100.000 to 1.000.000 inhabitants) 5.8
  (1.5)
 CITYSIZ3 (school in a city with a population higher than 1.000.000 inhabitants) 21.6a
 Ref: School in town with a population smaller than 100.000 (3.5)
 NOTHERSC (few schools in the neighbourhood -maximum, 2-) 0.1
  (0.0)
School 2. Students characteristics 
 ORINMIG1 (proportion of immigrant students from 0,1 to 10%) 0.0
 (0.0)
 ORINMIG2 (proportion of immigrant students from 10 to 20%) -9.9c
 (-1.7)
 ORINMIG3 (proportion of immigrant students higher than 20%) -17.7a
 (-3.4)
 SCEDMO (average years of schooling of the mothers) 2.9b
 (2.6)
 PCGIRLS (proportion of girls at school) 44.4b
  (2.0)
 SCNQWHIT (white collar, low skilled parents -mode-) -6.4
  (-1.0)
 SCQBLUE (blue collar, high skilled parents -mode-) 3.5
  (0.8)
 SCNQBLUE (blue collar, low skilled parents -mode-) -3.2
 Ref: White collar, skilled parents -mode- (-0.6)
School 3. School resources 
 STRATIO (student-teacher ratio) 0.3
  (0.6)
 PTEACH (proportion of part-time teachers ) 0.1
 (0.5)
 CLSIZ (class size) -0.2c
  (-1.9)
 COMPWEB (proportion of computers connected to the Internet) -1.9
 (-0.3)
 IRATCO (ratio of computers for instruction to school size) -60.1a
 (-2.9)
 NCOUNS (no school counsellors at the centre) -0.3
  (-0.1)
School 4. Educational practices 
 AUTCONT (school with autonomy in selecting teachers for hire) -3.9
 (-1.2)
 AUTBUDG (school with budgetary autonomy) 4.3
  (1.1)
 AUTEXT (autonomy for selecting textbooks) 5.1
 (0.8)
 AUTCONTE (school with autonomy for selecting course contents) 2.9
 (0.4)
 AUTOCU (school autonomy for modifying the curriculum) -3.6
  (-0.9)
 CRITADMI (religious or philosophical issues are used as an admittance criterion) 2.9
  (0.7)
 STREB (ability grouping between classes) -3.9
  (-1.2)
 STREW (ability grouping within classes) -1.1
 (-0.3)
 Number of level units  18.283
 
Note: a statistically significant at the 0.01 level; b statistically significant at the 0.05 level; c statistically 
significant at the 0.10 level; t-ratio (in parentheses). Estimations have been computed using HLM 6.25. 
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Table 3. Multilevel regression: Random effects. 
Variances Null model 
Complete 
model 
Schools (uj) 1.221,8 411,9
Students (ij) 6.748,3 4.117,3
Total (uj + ij) 7.970,1 4.529,2
% of the total variance explained by the variables   43,2
% of the level 1 (students) variance explained by the variables  39,0
% of the level 2 (schools) variance explained by the variables  66,3
 
Results for the individual level variables are consistent with previous empirical 
evidence. In line with OECD (2006) women score lower than men in science. The fact 
that students born earlier in the year still have an advantage over the rest at age 15 is 
also remarkable. The strongest effect among all the factors included in the model is 
linked to the course repetition variables. The negative signs of these effects suggest, on 
the one hand, the weak effectiveness of course repetition policies; on the other hand, 
that it is difficult to distinguish if repeating course causes directly low achievement or if 
“repeaters” share certain characteristics, not included in the model, that make them be 
low-scorers. 
 
Household socio-economic and cultural characteristics turned out to be very important 
for explaining the students’ performance in science. Students whose parents are 
economically active and which bellows to qualified white-collar households achieve 
higher scores in PISA. Results also show the positive and significant relationship 
between the years of schooling of mothers and the educational outcome of their 
children. Results associated to the immigrant origin of the family are noteworthy: 
students born in Spain with Spanish parents obtain better results in the science test than 
first generation immigrant students; however, differences in score with second 
generation immigrants are non-significant. This can be interpreted as the evidence of an 
assimilation and integration process of immigrant families. This result is reinforced by 
the fact that first generation immigrant students who have not studied at least the whole 
compulsory secondary education level in Spain (ESO), score lower than first generation 
immigrants who have been living in Spain at least for 4 years. 
 
Other results that we would like to highlight are those which try to come close to the 
household educational resources and their use by the students. The household’s number 
of books seems to be a good proxy for the family cultural capital and it is strongly and 
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positively correlated with outcomes in PISA., Coefficients related to the computer use 
variables show that making a correct use of educational resources (such as computers) 
has a stronger impact on the students educational outcomes than the simple fact of 
having educational resources at home. 
 
Ceteris paribus, students in PS obtain better results in the science test of PISA than 
those enrolled in PSPS. This result must be emphasized as previous studies about this 
topic in Spain such as Calero and Escardíbul (2007) and Mancebón and Muñiz (2008), 
did not find significant differences in the educational outcomes of public and private 
school and, in the bivariate analysis, the former score were lower than the latter.  
 
Results point out peer effects as the most important variables of the school level. The 
education level of mothers does not only have a positive effect on their children but it 
also has a positive effect on their children’s classmates. The proportion of girls at school 
is as well directly related to outcomes in PISA. Results in Table 2 also show that the 
negative impact on the educational outcome of students of sharing their class with 
immigrant students is only significant when the accumulation of immigrant students 
exceeds a certain threshold. 
 
The only significant variables among the school resources factors included in our 
analysis were the class size and the ratio of computers for instruction to school size. 
Larger classes seem to have a negative effect on educational outcomes. The strong and 
negative sign linked to the ratio of computers variable remains unexplained and should 
be subject for future studies. The lack of significance of variables such as the 
student-teacher ratio or the existence of counsellors at the school should help policy 
makers to measure the opportunity cost of frequently used input-based policies. 
  
Finally, no significant effects were found among the educational practices variables. 
Different types of school autonomy are found to be irrelevant. However, a deeper 
insight into this matter would require more detailed data on different aspects of 
autonomy. For this reason, our results in this area should be taken with caution.. When 
interpreting the ability grouping variables, one must keep in mind that, although being 
non significant in average, ability grouping policies may have important effects on 
different types of students as it has been explained in Subsection 3.1. 
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4. Efficiency assessment of the Spanish Public and Publicly-Subsidised Private 
Schools from PISA-2006 
 
In this Section, efficiency analysis of PS and PSPS participating in PISA-2006 is carried 
out using DEA methodology. This analysis involves comparing academic results 
obtained by pupils in each school with all the relevant inputs in the procurement of 
those results. A school is considered efficient if there is no other in the sample which is 
able to reach better outcomes with the same or less resources. On the other hand, an 
inefficient school obtains from its inputs endowment worse results than the reachable 
maximum ones. 
 
The three stages which have to be accomplished in every productive efficiency analysis 
are sequentially described: inputs and outputs selection, evaluation model selection and 
results description.  
 
4.1. The selection of the inputs and outputs of Spanish High Schools for DEA 
analysis 
 
The first stage in order to carry out a productive efficiency analysis is to select the 
variables which proxy the results and inputs of evaluated decision making units 
(DMUs). In this regard, data supplied by PISA-2006 are plentiful. As we have 
explained in Section 3, in this International Programme there is detailed information 
about competencies of pupils in different subjects (mathematics, reading and science), 
socio-economic family background of students and school inputs. 
 
Prescriptions generally accepted in DEA literature about selection of variables establish 
that this selection must respect some minimum requirements established by Bessent and 
Bessent (1980): a conceptual basis for the relationship of inputs to outputs; an 
empirically inferred relationship of measured inputs to outputs; increases in inputs must 
be associated with increases in outputs; and the measurements must not have zero 
elements.  
 
In order to fulfil all these conditions, we base the selection of variables on the results 
obtained from the empirical research on the determinants of educational outcomes in 
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PISA-2006 (see Section 3). Specifically, we select the scores of 15 year-old students in 
science competencies as the output of Spanish PS and PSPS and all the statistically 
significant variables found in the previous Section as inputs8. Table A3 in the Appendix 
summarises the average and standard deviation for all these variables. 
 
In summary, the efficiency of the Spanish PS and PSPS which participate in PISA-2006 
will be estimated on the basis of 12 variables. One of them (PV) proxies the output, two 
of them approach the resources available to each school (IRATCO and CLSIZ) and the 
other eight ones proxy the socio-economic and cultural context of the students.  
 
4.2. The selection of the DEA model 
 
In addition to the choice of input variables, efficiency analysis requires to decide how to 
measure performance. In recent years, during which the assessment of the efficiency of 
different samples of educational institutions has seen notable growth, it has become 
clear that parametric techniques reveal major drawbacks as an instrument for assessing 
the results of school institutions. Non-parametric frontier methods, such as DEA, on the 
other hand, have revealed themselves as being much more attractive in this context. The 
advantages attributed to this methodology, when assessing the efficiency of schools, 
have gained further backing by the intensive use made of this approach (see 
Worthington, 2001). The basic idea of DEA is to view schools as productive units 
which use multiple inputs (controllable and non-controllable) and outputs. The method 
produces measures of schools’ efficiency deriving a frontier production function 
(efficiency frontier) and measuring the distance of observations to this frontier to get 
their efficiency scores. Observations on the frontier get an efficiency score of one and 
those below the frontier get scores below one depending on their location (Kirjavainen 
and Loikkanen, 1998). 
 
The technique, which is based on mathematical programming, has evolved considerably 
since it first appeared in the seminal paper of Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978). 
Specifically, multiple extensions of the initial model have attempted to adapt the 
                                                          
8 We select those variables from the previous Section that have been proved as statistically influential in 
the academic results and are no categorical. Each input has been defined in such a way that its 
relationship with the output variable was positive. 
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mathematical formulation and the process of obtaining efficiency indexes to the 
peculiarities of the particular sector analysed, to the nature of the variables which make 
up the analysis, or to the aim sought in the research (see Cooper et al., 2004a and 2004b 
and Thanassoulis, 2001). 
 
From the different proposals found in the literature, the approach of Silva Portela and 
Thanassoulis (2001), based on Charnes et al. (1981), is of particular interest for the task 
which concerns us. This approach decomposes the overall measure of efficiency, 
computed using DEA, into managerial and programme components. The attractiveness 
of this approach lies in the fact that it makes it possible to differentiate between 
inefficiencies attributable to the individual management of a decision-making unit 
(hereafter DMU) and those attributable to a unit’s actual management programme –an 
aspect of great interest in this research, since we attempt to compare the behaviour of 
schools which work with different management models. We shall explain this approach 
using Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Efficiency decomposition according to Silva Portela and Thanassoulis (2001) 
 
This represents an organisation Z which plays its productive role according to a specific 
management model (model A). Its efficiency is to be evaluated for a set of organisations 
of which one part shares the same management model and the rest works under another 
model (model B). The application of DEA to both subsamples will identify the two 
frontiers which can be seen in the figure. 
 
Z’’’ 
Z’’ 
Z’ 
Output 
 
Input 
Frontier model A 
Frontier model B 
Z 
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The assessment of the output of organisation Z in relation to all the schools in the 
sample (regardless of the management model for each), through the DEA, will attribute 
an overall rate to this organisation with a value of Z’Z’’’/Z’Z (maximum output in the 
sector/ real output used by Z). This rate, as it is the result of the comparison with all the 
schools in the sector, includes the effects due to the school’s individual management 
and those attributable to the structural differences between the two management 
programmes which coexist in the sample.  
 
In order to ascertain the part of Z’s efficiency which is attributable to individual 
management (managerial efficiency), its production must be compared with that of the 
rest of the schools which run under the same management model, i.e. with frontier 
model A. The value of the index of efficiency which DEA will now attribute to Z will 
be Z’Z’’/ Z’Z (maximum output in model A/ real output used by Z). This efficiency, as 
it is the result of comparison with organisations functioning under the same 
management model, is only attributable to the individual practices of the school. 
 
Finally, the programme efficiency which Z works under will be the residual part of the 
global efficiency not attributable to individual management. Graphically, this is 
determined by the index Z’Z’’’/ Z’Z’’ (maximum output in the sector/ output which Z 
would use, if its individual management were efficient). We can thus immediately 
confirm that: 
 
Overall Efficiency = (Managerial Efficiency) x (Programme Efficiency)  (6) 
 
From this relationship the different indexes of efficiency may be computed by resolving 
three DEA models: one for the DMUs acting under model A (managerial efficiency of 
type A units); another for those working under model B (managerial efficiency of type 
B units); and another for all the schools (overall efficiency of each organisation). The 
programme efficiency is obtained using a simple quotient between overall and 
managerial efficiency. 
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5. Results of the efficiency analysis 
 
Table 4 exhibits the results from the efficiency analysis carried out according to the 
previously established criteria9. 
 
Table 4. Efficiency scores of inefficient schools. 
  Mean efficiency ANOVA test 
  PSPS PS Total Dif. on means Standard error Test 
Managerial efficiency 0.930 0.926 0.928 0.004 0.009 0.478 
Programme efficiency 0.962 0.982 0.964 -0.020 0.005 -3.996a 
Overall efficiency 
0.919 0.925 0.923 -0.006 0.008 -0.764 
(20.05) (43.64) (37.20)       
a indicates statistically significant differences between PSPS and PS at a 1% significance level. Figures 
in brackets are the percentage of schools with maximum efficiency (>0.99). 
 
The first row shows efficiency rates due exclusively to the individual performance of 
each school. Results of PS in this column cannot be compared to those results of PSPS, 
since both of them have been obtained in an independent way and the reference frontier 
used in each case is different. The second row displays the efficiency that can be 
attributed to structural differences between management models, public or private, 
under which each school acts. This value is the one that presents the highest interest for 
the aims pursued in this paper. Finally, the third row shows the estimates of the overall 
efficiency, corresponding to the comparison of all the schools of the sample, 
independently of their ownership. Therefore, this value includes the effects of individual 
performance (managerial efficiency) and those effects coming from the managerial 
model followed in PS and PSPS (programme efficiency). 
 
Results in Table 4 indicate that the difference between overall efficiency in PS and 
PSPS is very slight and statistically non significant. That is to say, once the differences 
in the type of pupil and resources in each school are taken into account, the advantages 
that PSPS present in gross educational results disappear. However, overall efficiency 
comprises the effects of individual school performance and those attributed to the 
management model followed by the school, to such an extent that overall efficiency 
                                                          
9 Efficiency estimations have been computed using ONFRONT software. The DEAs solved has applied 
the variant of variable returns to scale (Banker, Charnes and Cooper, 1984) and the orientation to 
maximizing output. 
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rates do not allow us to correctly visualise the result pursued in this paper. Namely, it 
could happen that, even though differences in overall efficiency between PS and PSPS 
were not detected, the management model of the first ones could negatively affect 
themselves and the individual performance of each public school compensated the 
disadvantage of adopting a much more bureaucratised management model with regard 
to PSPS (or vice versa). 
 
To solve this question, we must consider the results provided in the second row in Table 
4, that is, efficiency due to structural differences between management models 
(programme efficiency). Although overall efficiency values do not show large 
divergences, the differences found in this case become statistically significant in favour 
of PS. On the other hand, if the percentages of schools with the maximum overall 
efficiency are considered (values in brackets in Table 4), we conclude that this 
percentage is considerably larger among PS than among PSPS, what leads us to 
conclude that best practices in the sample are developed in a higher proportion by PS 
rather than PSPS. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper a non-parametric efficiency analysis of the Spanish PS and PSPS has been 
carried out using as reference the data supplied by PISA-2006. In order for this analysis 
to be accomplished in a rigorous way, a detailed study of the determinants of 
educational outcomes of students has been implemented by means of a multilevel 
model. Given the absence of a generalized empirical consensus about the variables 
which promote academic success of pupils, we think that any evaluation of school 
efficiency requires a thorough analysis of the empirical relationship between the 
variables selected as inputs and outputs. 
 
The main results obtained in this regard point to a very special relevance of household 
socio-economic and cultural characteristics for explaining the performance of students 
in science competencies. Other variables showing a great influence on educational 
results at the individual level are gender, grade repetition and household educational 
resources such as books and computers and their use by the students. Nearly 85% of the 
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variance in scores can be attributed to differences of the characteristics in students 
within schools.  
 
At the school level, peer effects are the most important variables in the promotion of 
results in science competencies (education level of mothers, proportion of girls at school 
and proportion of immigrant students). The only significant variables among the school 
resources factors included in our analysis were the class size and the ratio of computers 
for instruction to school size. 
 
These results, which are in concordance with a number of previous studies, allowed us 
to develop the analysis of efficiency of PS and PSPS. The most relevant result was that 
PS are more efficient than PSPS, once differences in pupil body and individual 
management inefficiencies have been eliminated. PSPS’ better crude scores in science 
competencies as measured in PISA-2006 vanish when those influences are removed 
from analysis.  
 
These results confirm the conclusions obtained in others international studies where 
publicly-granted private schools are shown to be inefficient relative to public ones 
(Barbetta and Turati, 2003 and Kirjavainen and Loikkanen, 1998). 
 
In the context of PISA data, conclusions from comparative efficiency analyses of public 
and private schools are mixed. While Calero and Waisgrais (2009) show that Spanish 
private schools (PSPS and private independent) present a negative influence in science 
competencies measured in PISA-2006, other papers employing Spanish PISA-2003 data 
do not point out a superiority of neither PS nor PSPS (Calero and Escardíbul, 2007 or 
Perelman and Santín, 2008). The main conclusion of these latter authors is that, once the 
effects related to the social composition of schools are discounted, the differences in 
educational performance shift to statistically non significant, which permits to suppose 
that these differences are more related to the type of pupils in each school and 
differential characteristics between these schools than to school quality. 
 
Since Calero and Escardíbul (2007) focus their analyses in the results from the 
mathematics assessment in PISA-2003, the explanation of the divergences with regard 
to our work and to Calero and Waisgrais (2009), where PISA-2006 is used, could be 
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found in a certain specialisation of public schools in science, subject in which PSPS 
prove to be less efficient10. The empirical testing of this hypothesis is definitely beyond 
the limits outlined in this paper and could be a specific issue for further research. 
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Appendix. Table A1.Students profile in Spanish PS and PSPS  
Type of variable Questionnaire itema PSPS PS Total ANOVA test 
Results Repeated grades 1.20 1.18 1.18 0.94 
Expectations - 
aspirations Students’ expected occupational status (BSMJ) 62.24 57.92 59.17 5.79*** 
Attitudes toward 
science 
Plausible value in interest in science (PVINTR) 526.23 539.47 535.86 -3.51*** 
Plausible value in support for scientific inquiry 
(PVSUPP) 530.53 526.94 527.92 0.77 
General interest in learning science (INTSCIE) -0.17 -0.19 -0.19 0.64 
Enjoyment of science (JOYSCIE) -0.11 -0.17 -0.15 1.87* 
Science self-efficacy (SCIEEFF) -0.01 -0.13 -0.10 3.49*** 
General value of science (GENSCIE) 0.34 0.26 0.28 2.65*** 
Personal value of science (PERSCIE) 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.81 
Science activities (SCIEACT) -0.14 -0.16 -0.15 0.76 
Personal Age (AGE) 15.83 15.82 15.82 0.36 
Occupational status 
of parents 
Mother’s occupational status. SEI index (BMMJ) 41.22 36.07 37.59 4.34*** 
Father’s occupational status. SEI index (BFMJ) 44.56 38.15 39.93 7.00*** 
Highest occupational status of parents. SEI index 
(HISEI) 47.82 41.11 42.96 6.85*** 
Educational level 
of parents 
Mother’s years of schooling (MEDUYEAR) 10.39 8.80 9.24 5.79*** 
Father’s years of schooling (FEDUYEAR) 10.60 8.72 9.24 7.33*** 
Highest years of schooling of parents (PARED) 11.90 10.32 10.75 6.78*** 
Household 
possessions scale 
indices  
Index of family wealth possessions (WEALTH) -0.07 -0.23 -0.18 4.87*** 
Index of cultural possessions at home 
(CULTPOSS) 0.19 0.00 0.05 5.30*** 
Index of home educational resources (HEDRES) 0.32 0.17 0.21 4.51*** 
Index of home possessions (HOMEPOS) 0.22 -0.02 0.04 6.74*** 
Index of economic, social and cultural status  
(ESCS) -0.08 -0.57 -0.44 7.30*** 
* and *** indicate statistically significant mean differences between  PSPS and PS at 10% and 1% significance 
level, respectively 
a Name of the variable in the PISA database between brackets 
Source: Own elaboration from PISA 2006 
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Appendix. Table A2. Variables used in the multilevel regression 
N Min. Max Mean
Standard 
Dev.
Individual
AGE (age of the student, in years) 18.283 15.33 16.33 15.84 0.29
WOMEN (gender dummy: 1 if women) 18.283 0 1 0.50 0.50
REPMORE (1st-2nd year of ESO) 18.283 0 1 0.06 0.23
REPONE (3rd year of ESO) 18.283 0 1 0.26 0.44
NOREPET (4rd year of ESO) 18.283 0 1 0.68 0.47
Household 1. Socioeconomic and cultural characteristics
NATIONAL (born in Spain, Spanish parents) 18.283 0 1 0.95 0.21
SECGEN (born in Spain, immigrant parents) 18.283 0 1 0.01 0.07
FIRST3 (born abroad; in Spain for 3 or less years) 18.283 0 1 0.02 0.12
FIRST4 (born abroad; in Spain for 4 or more years) 18.283 0 1 0.03 0.16
LANG1 (national; national language at home) 18.283 0 1 0.94 0.23
LANG2 (national; non-national language at home) 18.283 0 1 0.01 0.08
LANG3 (foreign; national language at home) 18.283 0 1 0.04 0.20
LANG4 (foreign; non-national language at home) 18.283 0 1 0.13 0.11
ACTIVE (both parents economicaly active) 18.283 0 1 0.72 0.44
QWHITEC (white collar; high skilled father) 18.283 0 1 0.33 0.45
NQWHITEC (white collar; low skilled father) 18.283 0 1 0.14 0.34
QBLUEC (blue collar; high skilled father) 18.283 0 1 0.33 0.45
NQBLUEC (blue collar; low skiled father) 18.283 0 1 0.20 0.38
MOTSCY (years of schooling: mother) 18.283 3.5 16.5 10.53 3.96
FATSCY (years of schooling: father) 18.283 3.5 16.5 10.55 3.98
Household 2. Educational resources and their uses
NCOMPUT (dummy: 1 if no computer at home) 18.283 0 1 0.10 0.30
REGUSECO (student uses computer frequently) 18.283 0 1 0.70 0.42
SPUSECOM (student uses computer sporadicaly) 18.283 0 1 0.24 0.24
NUSECOM (student never uses computer) 18.283 0 1 0.06 0.46
REGWRITE (uses word processors frequently) 18.283 0 1 0.15 0.35
SPOWRITE (uses word processors sporadicaly) 18.283 0 1 0.76 0.42
NEVWRITE (never uses word processors) 18.283 0 1 0.09 0.28
25BOOKS (0-25 books at home) 18.283 0 1 0.17 0.37
100BOOKS (26-100 books at home) 18.283 0 1 0.33 0.47
200BOOKS (101-200 books at home) 18.283 0 1 0.22 0.41
500BOOKS (more than 200 books at home) 18.283 0 1 0.27 0.44
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Appendix. Table A2. Variables used in the multilevel regression (cont.). 
 
N Min. Max Mean
Standard 
Dev.
School 1. School characteristics
PUBLIC (public school) 18.283 0 1 0.62 0.48
PRIVPUBF (private school; publicly funded) 18.283 0 1 0.38 0.48
SCHSIZ (school size) 18.283 50 2.539 675.49 389.59
CITYSIZ1 (population <100.000) 18.283 0 1 0.61 0.49
CITYSIZ2 (population 100.000-1,000.000) 18.283 0 1 0.36 0.48
CITYSIZ3 (population  >1.000.000) 18.283 0 1 0.03 0.16
NOTHERSC (maximum, 2 centers near the school) 18.283 0 1 0.32 0.46
School 2. Student characteristics
ORINMIG0 (school without immigrants) 18.283 0 1 0.48 0.50
ORINMIG1 (0,1-10% immigrant students) 18.283 0 1 0.36 0.48
ORINMIG2 (10-20% immigrant students) 18.283 0 1 0.10 0.31
ORINMIG3 (>20% immigrant students) 18.283 0 1 0.05 0.23
SCEDMO (average years of schooling of mothers) 18.283 6.29 15.98 10.53 1.71
PCGIRLS (proportion of girls at school) 18.283 0.49 0.08 0 0.91
SCQWHITE (white collar, high skilled -mode-) 18.283 0 1 0.40 0.49
SCNQWHIT (white collar, low skilled -mode-) 18.283 0 1 0.02 0.13
SCQBLUE (blue collar, high skilled -mode) 18.283 0 1 0.45 0.50
SCNQBLUE (blue collar, low skilled -mode-) 18.283 0 1 0.13 0.34
School 3. School resources
STRATIO (student-teacher ratio) 18.283 1.19 30.55 11.74 4.37
PTEACH (proportion of part-time teachers) 18.283 6.73 6.98 0 79
CLSIZ (class size) 18.283 13 53 25.94 10.13
COMPWEB (proportion of computers with Internet) 18.283 0.07 1 0.89 0.17
IRATCO (computers for instruction/ school size) 18.283 0.01 0.72 0.11 0.08
School 4. Educational practices
NCOUNS (1=no school counselors at the center) 18.283 0 1 0.20 0.39
AUTCONT (autonomy for selecting teachers for hire) 18.283 0 1 0.37 0.48
AUTBUDG (budgetary autonomy) 18.283 0 1 0.60 0.49
AUTEXT (autonomy for selecting textbooks) 18.283 0 1 0.95 0.23
AUTCONTE (autonomy for selecting contents) 18.283 0 1 0.57 0.49
AUTOCU (autonomy for modifying the curriculum) 18.283 0 1 0.54 0.50
CRITADMI (religious or philosophical issues are used as 
an admitance criterion) 18.283 0 1 0.30 0.45
STREB (ability grouping between classes) 18.283 0 1 0.48 0.47
STREW (ability groupong within classes) 18.283 0 1 0.44 0.46
Source: Own elaboration from PISA-2006.
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Appendix. Table A3. Variables used in the DEA model 
Variable Definition 
PSPS  PS   Total 
Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.   Mean S.D. 
Output: PVS Outcome in science (plausible value) 502.86 85.69 475.08 90.07  488.14 90.60 
Input 1: NATIONAL Percentage of students born in Spain 95.19% 0.76 90.04% 0.96  91.88% 0.68 
Input 2: PCGIRLS Proportion of girls at school 52.11% 2.01 48.64% 0.68  49.46% 0.72 
Input 3: NOREPET Percentage of students not repeating any grade 72.43% 1.26 51.19% 1.07  59.84% 0.85 
Input 4: MOTSCY Mother’s years of schooling 10.39 4.43 8.80 4.67  9.63 4.73 
Input 5: REGWRITE 
& SPOWRITE 
Percentage of students who use the 
computer frequently or sporadically 
to write documents 
89.64% 0.77 84.51% 0.87  86.82% 0.60 
Input 6: QWHITEC Percentage of pupils whose father's job is white collar high skilled 38.21% 2.07 22.30% 1.10  30.69% 1.00 
Input 7: LANG1 Percentage of native students who speak  national language 93.32% 0.79 87.19% 1.05  89.16% 0.75 
Input 8: 500BOOKS Percentage of students with more than 200 books at home 28.32% 1.48 17.99% 0.86  23.95% 0.86 
Input 9: ACTIVE 
Percentage of students whose both 
father and mother are active working 
population 
73.83% 1.24 65.12% 1.02  68.98% 0.76 
Input10: IRATCO Ratio of computers for instruction to school size (reverse) 15.93 0.04 8.36 0.10  9.96 0.09 
Input 11: CLSIZ Average class size  30.43 10.91  26.29 8.33   27.78 9.67 
Note: Variables have been re-defined in such a way that their relationship with output was positive, basic requirement in 
DEA models to estimate efficiency 
Source: Own elaboration from PISA 2006 
 
